“The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You Can Be”: How Government Surveillance of Muslim Americans Violates First Amendment Rights by Shahabuddin, Madiha
Chapman Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 2 Article 9
2015
“The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You
Can Be”: How Government Surveillance of
Muslim Americans Violates First Amendment
Rights
Madiha Shahabuddin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Madiha Shahabuddin, “The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You Can Be”: How Government Surveillance of Muslim Americans
Violates First Amendment Rights, 18 Chap. L. Rev. 577 (2015).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol18/iss2/9
Do Not Delete 2/16/2015 10:14 AM 
 
577 
“The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble 
You Can Be”:1 How Government Surveillance 
of Muslim Americans2 Violates First 
Amendment Rights 
Madiha Shahabuddin* 
INTRODUCTION 
When Imam Hamid Hassan Raza, leader of Brooklyn’s 
Masjid Al-Ansar, meets newcomers at his mosque, he treads 
carefully.3 After learning of the New York Police Department 
(NYPD)’s targeted surveillance of Muslim “hotspots”4 such as 
 
 * JD, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, May 2015; BA, University 
of California, Irvine, June 2012. I would like to thank Professor Ronald Steiner for his 
invaluable supervision and feedback as a faculty advisor; Fatima Dadabhoy, Esq. for 
allowing me to gain insight from her experiences as a civil rights attorney; and the 
Chapman Law Review staff for their efforts in producing this Comment. Finally, I would 
like to thank my friends and family for their support in this endeavor, my fiancé for his 
unwavering encouragement, and most importantly, my parents, who helped make all of 
this a reality. 
 1 Taken from a quote by a nineteen-year-old female Muslim student at Brooklyn 
College, New York, on how the NYPD’s surveillance of the Muslim community treats their 
religious expression and behavior. Her full quote reads: “It’s as if the law says: the more 
Muslim you are, the more trouble you can be, so decrease your Islam.” MUSLIM AMERICAN 
CIVIL LIBERTIES COALITION (MACLC) ET AL., MAPPING MUSLIMS: NYPD SPYING AND ITS 
IMPACT ON AMERICAN MUSLIMS 12 (2012) [hereinafter MAPPING MUSLIMS], available at 
http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf. 
 2 The term “Muslim Americans” will be used throughout this Comment to describe 
citizens and residents of the United States who are Muslim, i.e., ascribe to the faith of 
Islam. For an interesting discussion on the “hyphenated identities” of second generation 
Muslims in the United States, see generally Selcuk R. Sirin & Michelle Fine, Hyphenated 
Selves: Muslim American Youth Negotiating Identities on the Fault Lines of Global 
Conflict, 11 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 151 (2007); YVONNE YAZBECK HADDAD, NOT QUITE 
AMERICAN?: THE SHAPING OF ARAB AND MUSLIM IDENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2004). 
As a reflection of such hybrid identities, according to a 2011 Gallup Report, “Muslim 
Americans [i]dentify [w]ith the United States and [t]heir [f]aith [e]qually.” ABU DHABI 
GALLUP CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: FAITH, FREEDOM, AND THE FUTURE 50 (2011) 
[hereinafter GALLUP REPORT], available at http://turcopolier.typepad.com/files/mar_rep 
ort_adgc_bilingual_072011_sa_lr_web.pdf.  
 3 Complaint at 14, Raza v. City of New York, 998 F. Supp. 2d 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(No. 13–CV–3448), 2013 WL 6177392 at *1, available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/ 
default/files/assets/nypd_surveillance_complaint_-_final_06182013_1.pdf.  
 4 See Petra Bartosiewicz, NYPD Surveillance of Muslims Has Created a Climate of 
Fear, NATION (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/173400/nypd-surveil 
lance-muslims-has-created-climate-fear (“The NYPD’s counterterrorism strategy, which 
was developed in part by former and current CIA officials, has focused on ‘intelligence 
collection’ intended to thwart potential terrorist plots through the heavy scrutiny of 
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Muslim businesses and mosques for counterterror intelligence 
gathering, he “is hesitant to approach newcomers until they are 
better known in the Masjid Al-Ansar community.”5 Due to 
multiple “chance” encounters with plainclothes police officers,6 
threats of his sermons being taken out of context and used 
against him,7 and his fears of what being targeted by the NYPD 
would mean for his wife and child,8 Raza has “considered leaving 
the pulpit.”9  
Ironically, Masjid Al-Ansar is named after the Arabic word 
ansar, which means “the helpers” and in the Islamic tradition 
refers to the support and sense of community fostered during the 
time when the Prophet Muhammad and his followers had newly 
arrived to the city of Madina.10 After the Associated Press broke 
the news about the NYPD’s “Muslim Surveillance Program” in 
August 2011,11 mosque  
[c]ongregants grew even more suspicious of newcomers [for fear they 
were informants], and a constant sense of suspicion now exists among 
the mosque’s congregants. There [was] . . . a steep decline in mosque 
attendance, as the number of worshippers attending afternoon 
prayers on weekdays . . . declined from approximately twenty people 
to just two or three people.12  
A once “vibrant and lively mosque community” dwindled into a 
fearful group of isolated individuals apprehensive about the 
consequences of their mosque attendance and regular interaction 
with others in their community, disallowing the opportunity for 
Masjid Al-Ansar to live up to its name.13 Raza in particular found 
that his wariness of new mosque attendees prevented him from 
 
so-called Muslim ‘hot spots’ such as mosques.”); see also MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, 
at 12 (noting that the NYPD “mapped, photographed or infiltrated at least 250 mosques 
in the New York City [area] . . . and deemed these places of worship ‘hot spots,’ with any 
activity in or around the mosques meriting surveillance”).  
 5 Complaint, supra note 3, at 14. 
 6 Id. at 10–11. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 14. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Ansar - Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/ansar (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).  
 11 See generally Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, With CIA Help, NYPD Moves 
Covertly in Muslim Areas, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 23, 2011, available at 
http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/With-CIA-help-NYPD-moves-covertly-in 
-Muslim-areas; Highlights of AP’s Pulitzer Prize-Winning Probe into NYPD Intelligence 
Operations, ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://www.ap.org/media-center/nypd/investigation (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2013) [hereinafter AP NYPD Probe].  
 12 Complaint, supra note 3, at 15. 
 13 Id. at 16. 
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“effectively [fulfilling] his role as a religious and spiritual 
counselor and teacher.”14  
On June 18, 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), Creating Law Enforcement Accountability and 
Responsibility (CLEAR) Project, and New York Civil Liberties 
Union (NYCLU) filed a lawsuit on behalf of Raza (the named 
plaintiff) and other Muslim individuals who were targeted by 
NYPD surveillance, alleging that they suffered injuries caused by 
such conduct.15 The lawsuit was filed against the City of New 
York, Mayor Bloomberg, Police Commissioner Raymond W. 
Kelly, and other city officials. The complaint alleged 
“suspicionless surveillance” of “mapped” Muslim individuals and 
organizations and the deployment of informants “without any 
suspicion of wrongdoing.”16 Raza v. City of New York represents 
one of the more recent and publicized legal challenges to the 
government’s surveillance of Muslim Americans without any 
other indication of suspicion or wrongdoing except being Muslim, 
or perhaps, as this Comment will discuss, being “too Muslim.”17  
On April 15, 2014, after months of public outcry—and 
undoubtedly bad press18—the NYPD announced it would disband 
the controversial and constitutionally suspect “Zone Assessment 
 
 14 Id. at 14. 
 15 Id. at 2; Raza v. City of New York - Legal Challenge to NYPD Muslim Surveillance 
Program, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/national-security/raza-v-city-
new-york-legal-challenge-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
 16 Complaint, supra note 3, at 1. 
 17 Hassan v. City of New York, filed in federal district court in New Jersey, similarly 
alleged NYPD spying on Muslim individuals and institutions, including an all-girls 
Muslim school. Federal District Judge William Martini dismissed the suit on February 
20, 2014. It was “[t]he first legal challenge to the New York police department’s blanket 
surveillance of Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.” Ed Pilkington, Federal 
Judge Tosses Out Legal Challenge over NYPD Surveillance of Muslims, GUARDIAN (Feb. 
21, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/nypd-muslim-surveillance-legal-
challenge-judge. The Hassan plaintiffs alleged similar violations of the First Amendment 
caused by law enforcement surveillance and its resulting effect on religious expression, 
such as: lowered mosque attendance, avoidance of public prayer, and discontinuance of 
religious or political discussions. Hassan v. City of New York, No. 2:12–3401 (WJM), 2014 
WL 654604, at *2–3 (D. N.J. Feb. 20, 2014). The plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on 
March 21, 2014. Hassan v. City of New York, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., http://www.ccr 
justice.org/Hassan (last visited Apr. 27, 2014).  
 18 See, e.g., Laila Alawa, America Is the Land of the Free — Unless You’re Muslim, 
POLICYMIC (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.policymic.com/articles/83443/america-is-the-land-
of-the-free-unless-you-re-muslim (disapproving of Hassan case dismissal); Faiza Patel, 
Blanket Spying on Muslims ‘Makes Us Less Safe’, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (Mar. 25, 
2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/blanket-spying-muslims-%E2%80%98mak 
es-us-less-safe%E2%80%99 (pointedly critiquing New York City officials’ conduct in 
connection with NYPD spying); Carla Murphy, NYPD (Finally) Gets Independent 
Oversight, COLORLINES (Mar. 28, 2014, 5:55 PM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2014/03/ 
nypd_finally_gets_independent_oversight.html (applauding the announcement of a 
first-ever inspector general with subpoena power and oversight authority over the NYPD 
in the wake of stop-and-frisk and Muslim spying programs).  
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Unit” (formerly called “Demographics Unit”) within their 
department used to map Muslim communities in the region.19 
This action by the NYPD could be heralded as the right step 
towards ending the stigmatization of religious expression by 
Muslim Americans and tells us that it is possible to refrain from 
alienating and burdening an entire religious community in the 
name of counterterrorism. Despite this move, however, some 
question whether it will mean any real difference.20  
This Comment will argue that the government’s targeted, 
suspicionless surveillance of Muslim Americans in the name of 
counterterror efforts has effectively restricted the Muslim 
community’s First Amendment freedoms of association, religion, 
and speech. Part I will discuss a brief background of surveillance, 
leading up to a report on the current effects of surveillance 
programs on Muslim Americans today. The discussion in Part II 
will turn to the case law and legal standards for First 
Amendment claims in the context of Muslim surveillance, 
advocating for and applying the strict scrutiny test to establish 
that the government’s conduct has in fact infringed on Muslim 
Americans’ rights to free association, religion, and speech. Part 
III will then conclude by offering solutions to counterterror 
efforts which do not criminalize mere adherence to a particular 
faith, including a cease of widespread government surveillance 
(i.e., not treating Muslims as a suspect class) and offering gang 
intervention models as a possible alternative to the current 
practice of government counterterrorism programs.  
I. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF SURVEILLANCE 
A.  What Is Surveillance? 
Professor Christopher Slobogin defines surveillance as 
“government efforts to gather information about people from a 
distance, usually covertly and without entry into private 
spaces.”21 Surveillance as a general phenomenon is then broken 
 
 19 Editorial, Spying at the N.Y.P.D., N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.ny 
times.com/2014/04/17/opinion/spying-at-the-nypd.html.  
 20 See Anna Lekas Miller, The NYPD Has Disbanded Its Most Notorious Spy Unit, 
but Is the Age of Muslim Surveillance Really Over?, NATION (Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/179504/nypd-has-disbanded-its-most-notorious-spy-unit-
age-muslim-surveillance-really-over. One community leader noted that although the Zone 
Assessment Unit “doesn’t exist anymore, there is all this information that they have 
compiled . . . [and w]e have questions about whether . . . the forms of profiling that the 
unit was engaged in will transform or change into newer forms of profiling under the 
auspices of other units.” Id. 
 21 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 3 (2007); see also NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND 
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 443 (2003) (explaining that “political surveillance . . . is aimed 
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down into three categories: 1) communications surveillance, 
which is “the real-time interception of communications”; 
2) physical surveillance, which is “the real-time observation of 
physical activities”; and 3) transaction surveillance, which is the 
“accessing [of] recorded information about communications, 
activities, and other transactions.”22 According to Slobogin, since 
9/11, “the United States government has been obsessed, as 
perhaps it should be, with ferreting out national security 
threats,” but “more than occasionally it has also visited 
significant intrusion on large numbers of law-abiding citizens—
sometimes inadvertently, sometimes not.”23 Within the context of 
national security, intelligence gathering24 of pattern occurrences 
in neighborhoods and communities is intended to “analyze broad 
or meaningful trends” as a means of assessing the validity and 
likelihood of a national security threat.25 
Such intelligence gathering, however, armed with a 
prejudicial purpose can result in “selective surveillance” that 
imposes burdens on Muslim Americans’ First Amendment rights, 
further alienating this particular community from the 
government.26 The surveillance of Muslim Americans operates 
along a similar, yet covert, vein of the “Broken Windows”27 theory 
of policing. Developed by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, 
this theory posits that when a community riddled with violence 
and crime becomes less tolerant of the minor causes of social 
disorder, a decrease in violent crime will result.28 
Implementation of the Broken Windows theory has resulted in 
aggressive “zero tolerance policing” in New York City, with its 
stated goal being to increase misdemeanor arrests on the streets 
 
at uncovering criminal behavior” and occurs “in contexts where there is no specific 
evidence of criminal behavior that triggered the investigatory activity”).  
 22 SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 3. 
 23 Id. at 3–4. 
 24 Like David Smith’s work, this Comment will treat surveillance and intelligence 
gathering as synonymous. See generally David Smith, Presumed Suspect: Post-9/11 
Intelligence Gathering, Race, and the First Amendment, 11 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 
85, 131 (2012). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 133; TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR FACTORY: INSIDE THE FBI’S 
MANUFACTURED WAR ON TERRORISM 49–50 (2013); see also ABRAMS, supra note 21 (noting 
the “concern about the chilling effect of government’s intrusion into the arena of political 
and religious discourse and possible trenching on First Amendment freedoms”).  
 27 This theory is named after an analogy George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson 
espoused in a 1982 article they published in The Atlantic: “[I]f a window in a building is 
broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. . . . One 
unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows 
costs nothing.” GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN 
WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 19 (1996).  
 28 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCIENCE 112 (Jack R. Greene ed., 3d ed. 2007). 
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in an effort to reduce other, more violent crime.29 While there has 
been much social science research conducted to test the Broken 
Windows theory, “there is no reliable empirical support for the 
proposition that disorder causes crime or that broken-windows 
policing reduces serious crime.”30  
Taken from a broader lens, this theory, which supports the 
policing and monitoring of one another within a community, 
creates a problematic phenomenon when placed within the 
context of Muslim American surveillance. Implementation of 
forms of the Broken Windows theory into Muslim intelligence 
gathering has resulted in the widespread distrust and fear of the 
Muslim community vis-à-vis not only law enforcement, but also 
vis-à-vis itself.31 It is an unfortunate and inherently unjust 
consequence of the billions of dollars the government has 
invested to survey, track, infiltrate, and even prosecute Muslim 
Americans.32 Indeed, as civil rights attorney Fatima Dadabhoy 
poses it, it seems the question now remains: “Does this mean that 
Muslims are merely subjected to a second tier system of free 
speech that relates to their faith?”33  
B.  A Brief History of Surveillance 
While government surveillance of certain individuals and 
communities is nothing new, its objectionable nature persists. In 
the 1920s, under the direction of J. Edgar Hoover, the 
Department of Justice’s General Intelligence Division 
maintained a list of 450,000 names of individuals who were 
considered “Bolshevik” or “Soviet-inspired.”34 In addition to 
wiretapping and trespassing, among the individuals the Justice 
Department identified for their list were Hellen Keller and future 
Supreme Court justices Felix Frankfurter and Arthur Goldberg.35  
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See infra notes 136–143 and accompanying text. 
 32 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 16–17, 44–45, 49–50, 234; see also STEPHEN DOWNS 
& KATHY MANLEY, PROJECT SALAM & NAT’L COAL. TO PROTECT CIVIL FREEDOMS, 
INVENTING TERRORISTS: THE LAWFARE OF PREEMPTIVE PROSECUTION 33 (2014), available 
at http://www.projectsalam.org/Inventing-Terrorists-study.pdf (“It may be that in order to 
bypass constitutional prohibitions against mass surveillance, the government has 
preemptively prosecuted hundreds of (mostly) Muslims in the last decade in order to 
create the illusion of a terrorist threat to the U.S.—which would justify the secret mass 
surveillance spy network.”).  
 33 Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, Civil Rights Manager, Council on Am. Islamic 
Relations, in Anaheim, Cal. (Jan. 31, 2014).  
 34 Nancy Murray & Sarah Wunsch, Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis: Lessons from 
History, 87 MASS. L. REV. 72, 78 (2002). 
 35 Id. at 78–79.  
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During World War II, the Japanese community in California 
was mapped much like the mapping of Muslim communities in 
the United States today, the justification then being that it would 
protect America from another attack after Pearl Harbor.36 Local 
law enforcement have recently implemented mapping and 
surveillance programs of Muslims, as evinced by the 2007 Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) plan to map local Muslims 
and the more recent NYPD surveillance of East Coast/New York 
area Muslims, which “[e]erily . . . bears [a] striking resemblance 
to the mistreatment experienced by Japanese Americans in the 
wake of Pearl Harbor.”37 
In 1956, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) began its 
Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which spied on 
individuals and groups identified as “subversive” to 
“neutralize . . . radical or immoral activity.”38 Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., the NAACP, civil rights groups, the ACLU, and even 
the Boy Scouts of America were targets of government spying in 
this era, for fear that these organizations or individuals were 
infiltrated, or influenced, by Communism.39 A few decades later, 
during the 1960s and 1970s, the government cast its net of 
surveillance wider, to include anti-Vietnam War advocates, the 
Black Panthers, the “New Left,” and women’s rights groups.40 It 
was around this time that local law enforcement set up their own 
programs to conduct surveillance on a local level, such as the 
“New York Red Squad,” which “was reported to have files on over 
one million people.”41 After the 1972 attacks at the Munich 
Olympic Games and “[a]s early as 1986, the government was 
considering plans to use two military bases to detain Arab- and 
Iranian-Americans in the same vein as the Japanese internment 
of World War II.”42 
 
 36 Rabea Chaudhry, Effective Advocacy in a Time of Terror: Redefining the Legal 
Representation of a Suspected Terrorist Facing Secret Evidence, 8 UCLA J. ISLAMIC 
& NEAR E.L. 101, 106 (2009). 
 37 Id. at 106–07 (“‘Just as Asian Americans have been “raced” as foreign, and from 
there as presumptively disloyal, Arab American[s] and Muslims have been “raced” as 
“terrorists”: foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening.’”) (quoting Natsu Taylor Saito, 
Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the “Racing” of Arab Americans 
as “Terrorists”, 8 ASIAN AM. L.J. 1, 12 (2001)); see also Complaint, supra note 3, at 1–3. 
 38 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 34, at 81 (internal quotations omitted); see also 
Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, Civil Liberties in the Struggle Against Terror, in LEGAL 
ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERROR 141, 163 n.46 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. 
Turner eds., 2010) (describing COINTELPRO tactics as “generally illegal and focused on 
repressing political dissent”).  
 39 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 34, at 81; Smith, supra note 24, at 140–41. 
 40 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 34, at 81; Eric Lane, On Madison, Muslims, and 
the New York City Police Department, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 689, 695–96 (2012). 
 41 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 34, at 81. 
 42 Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 705 (2010). 
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Most recently, the post-9/11 era has been characterized by 
government surveillance of Muslim American communities in the 
name of counterterrorism efforts.43 The government’s conduct in 
this surveillance program was highlighted in news stories that 
broke around August 2011 about the NYPD conducting mass 
surveillance of Muslim communities in New York.44 The 
Associated Press ran a series of investigative reports on this 
topic, noting that the NYPD effectively “monitored every aspect 
of Muslim life and built databases on where innocent Muslims 
eat, shop, work and pray.”45 And in July 2014, it was revealed 
that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had—at the 
minimum—spied on five “politically active” Muslim American 
leaders, including a past Bush administration official, a 
successful attorney, a Rutgers professor, a former California 
State University professor, and an executive director of the 
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR).46  
At the root of these investigations is the tool of profiling, 
which allows the NYPD, FBI, or other governmental entity to 
target certain groups of individuals solely based upon their 
religious affiliation and pursue an almost carte blanche “fishing 
expedition” for evidence condemning the targeted Muslim of 
some link to terrorist activity.47 Justification for this treatment of 
Muslim American communities has come from the idea that the 
post-9/11 era calls for “urgent” action to thwart mass destruction 
that can come from a potential terror attack, and therefore—as 
the argument goes—constitutional infringements like this are a 
“small price to pay for [America’s] safety.”48  
C.  Surveillance of Muslim Americans  
At the core of this issue is what Sahar F. Aziz has called 
“selective counterterrorism enforcement.”49 This manifests itself 
 
 43 See generally MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1; Bartosiewicz, supra note 4. 
 44 See generally AP NYPD Probe, supra note 11.  
 45 Lane, supra note 40, at 699 (citing Matt Apuzzo, NYPD-CIA Alliance’s Authority 
Questioned, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 21, 2012, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday. 
com/USCP/PNI/NEWS/2012-01-21-BCUSNYPD-Intelligence3rd-LdWritethru_ST_U.htm).  
 46 Elias Isquith, New Greenwald Bombshell: NSA Spied on 5 Politically Active 
Muslim-Americans, SALON (July 9, 2014, 7:11 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/07/09/ 
new_greenwald_bombshell_nsa_targeted_5_politically_active_muslim_americans/.  
 47 See generally Lane, supra note 40, at 702–07 (noting that if the NYPD cannot find 
their Muslim terror suspect, “they will watch as many [Muslims] as possible in hopes of 
catching a glimpse of one who appears to be traveling along the route they judge to be 
leading to committing or aiding in terrorism”).  
 48 Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Profiling, Terrorism, and Time, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 
1181, 1199 (2005).  
 49 Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 
147, 183–84 (2014). 
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in: the disproportionate targeting of Muslims for surveillance;50 
government-sent informants tasked with infiltration and what 
many have argued should be legally considered entrapment of 
individuals;51 and mapping and spying on predominantly Muslim 
neighborhoods, Muslim-owned businesses, mosques, and Muslim 
Student Associations.52 Outside the scope of this Comment, but 
still critically troubling, are the deportations of religious leaders 
and imams for sermons “deemed too critical of the American 
government,”53 the criminalization and prosecution of charitable 
and humanitarian aid organizations under sweeping material 
support statutes,54 and private acts of prejudice against Muslims 
in the form of mosque vandalism and employment 
discrimination.55  
As author and investigative journalist Trevor Aaronson 
argues, in the context of surveillance of Muslims, the government 
has used intelligence gathering as a means of “manufacturing” 
counterterror prosecutions that result in “what a federal judge 
has called a ‘fantasy terror operation’” created and incited by a 
government informant.56 Such intelligence gathering assists the 
government “in furtherance of an adversarial system that 
prioritizes bolstering the number of terrorism investigations, 
prosecutions, and convictions of Muslims in America.”57 
 
 50 See Kirstie Ball & Frank Webster, The Intensification of Surveillance, in THE 
INTENSIFICATION OF SURVEILLANCE: CRIME, TERRORISM AND WARFARE IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 1, 20 (Kirstie Ball & Frank Webster eds., 2003) (“Responses to 
September 11 have increased possibilities for ‘racial’ profiling along ‘Arab’ lines in 
particular, the consequences of which are already seen in the American detention of 
several thousand ‘suspects’ and a FBI trawl of more than 200 campuses to collect 
information about ‘Middle Eastern’ students.”). 
 51 Aziz, supra note 49; see also AARONSON, supra note 26, at 146, 195. 
 52 AP NYPD Probe, supra note 11; Complaint, supra note 3, at 5–9. 
 53 Aziz, supra note 49, at 184. 
 54 Id. at 184–85; 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012). “The government employs an extremely 
broad criminal substantive standard—material support—which encompasses any activity 
in association with a group classified as a terrorist organization. Giving [an] organization 
money is the most obvious example of material support, but even the volunteering of one’s 
time also constitutes material support.” Symposium, Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of 
Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1203, 1213–14 
(2008). 
 55 Aziz, supra note 49, at 186; see, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, Abercrombie & Fitch Liable for Religious Discrimination in EEOC Suit, Court 
Says (Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-9-13.cfm (noting 
employer unlawfully discriminated against female Muslim employee wearing a 
headscarf). The “secret evidence” problem similarly strips Muslim defendants of their 
rights. David Cole, professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center, has stated that 
in the context of terror prosecutions, “[t]he government has . . . informed us that it is 
relying on classified evidence that it cannot tell us about. So we must defend the group 
without knowing the accusations against it, and without seeing most of the evidence in 
the file.” Symposium, supra note 54, at 1216. See generally Chaudhry, supra note 36. 
 56 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 234–35. 
 57 Aziz, supra note 49, at 182.  
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Additionally, Aziz refutes the presumption about domestic or 
“homegrown” terrorism in the United States being the result of 
radicalization of all Muslim Americans within their own 
communities.58 One category of these “homegrown terrorism” 
cases involve most often “young, vulnerable men with mental 
health or financial problems upon whom paid informants prey. 
Often, these informants also play leading roles in concocting and 
implementing the fake terrorist plot.”59 
Ironically, for all the emphasis placed on rooting out the 
“homegrown” terrorists in Muslim communities, Aziz argues that 
“[i]ndeed, Muslim communities know much less than law 
enforcement about these cases because, unlike community 
members, law enforcement has information drawn from 
extensive surveillance networks and intelligence databases at the 
local, state, and federal level.”60 As a result of this “[p]ervasive 
government scrutiny of Muslim communities,” Muslims feel 
“pressured to downplay their religious identity” and “fear 
becoming too active in . . . religious activities” because they worry 
that these are “indicative” to the government of “terrorist 
inclinations.”61  
In a report prepared by the Muslim American Civil Liberties 
Coalition (MACLC), the Creating Law Enforcement 
Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) project, and the Asian 
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF), East 
Coast Muslims were interviewed to assess their experiences with 
being a part of a community targeted by NYPD surveillance. 
Most interviewees acknowledged that the public appearance of a 
Muslim identity would “invite[] unwanted attention or 
surveillance from law enforcement.”62 Traditional or Islamic 
garb, a beard, a hijab (headscarf), or a niqaab (face covering) 
were such displays of a Muslim identity which, to the NYPD, 
would “serve as indicators of ‘dangerousness.’”63 Some Muslims 
 
 58 See id. at 215.  
 59 Id. at 214–15. See generally Said, supra note 42. See also Jon Sherman, “A Person 
Otherwise Innocent”: Policing Entrapment in Preventative, Undercover Counterterrorism 
Investigations, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1475, 1478 (2009); Interview with Fatima 
Dadabhoy, supra note 33; see AARONSON, supra note 26, at 146, 195; HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., ILLUSION OF JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS 
ABUSES IN US TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 22 (2014), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/ 
default/files/reports/usterrorism0714_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf (noting that in the sting 
operation cases studied, the government “often chose targets who were particularly 
vulnerable—whether because of mental disability, or because they were indigent and 
needed money that the government offered them”). 
 60 Aziz, supra note 49, at 215.  
 61 Id. at 180–81; Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33.  
 62 MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 15.  
 63 Id.  
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have stopped religious expression through praying in public, 
wearing headscarves, growing beards (an Islamic tradition), or 
donning Islamic or “Muslim looking” garb.64 As one interviewee, 
an interfaith community organizer, put it, “[a] hijab or beard 
isn’t just about being different and not fitting in . . . it’s also that 
people will see me as [someone who is] prone to violence.”65  
One Muslim student attending Brooklyn College said his 
parents forbid him from attending Muslim Student Association 
events on campus and wearing the Islamic skullcap in public, out 
of fear of being openly identified as a Muslim based on 
appearances.66 In addition, “[l]aw enforcement scrutiny of 
outward manifestations of ‘Muslim’ characteristics” prompted 
some Muslims to alter their appearances and the practice of their 
faith.67 A City University of New York (CUNY) student found 
that this scrutiny of outward Muslim appearances made some 
people “water down” the practice of their religion, an unfortunate 
and unwarranted consequence of the government surveillance.68 
One professor at Baruch College stated that in a class discussion, 
her Muslim students told her that participating in a Muslim 
Student Association could lead to law enforcement scrutiny and 
being labeled an extremist.69  
These actions by the government and the resulting response 
of fear by the Muslim community raise serious First Amendment 
concerns, including the chilling of free association, which is 
considered an expressive right. Implementing a form of guilt by 
association, government surveillance and law enforcement create 
a presumption that “Muslims . . . know more about each other 
than other communities with members that have engaged in 
domestic terrorism.”70 
 
 64 Aziz, supra note 49, at 181. 
 65 MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 15. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 17. 
 68 Id. One interviewee in the report said she hid her religious identity at her place of 
employment, and another interviewee “wondered whether she should ‘water down’ her 
‘Muslimness’ on her resume.” Id. at 30–31. The stigma Muslims carry for merely being 
Muslim are stifling and stunting their opportunities for growth in society and the 
workplace, forcing them to choose between their ability to freely express their religion or 
practice a form of socially palatable Islam (if, even that, is palatable to begin with). 
 69 Id. at 31.  
 70 Aziz, supra note 49, at 182.  
For example, law enforcement has yet to invest in community policing 
programs focused on Christian evangelical communities that support bombing 
abortion clinics or attacking doctors who administer abortions, far-right 
Christian communities that stockpile weapons because they wish to overthrow 
the government or believe the end of the world is near, or predominantly Anglo  
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS INFRINGED 
A.  Freedom of Association 
Freedom of association is a fundamental right expressly 
recognized by the Supreme Court under the First Amendment.71 
Associational freedoms have been recognized in two 
forms: expressive and intimate.72 The United States Supreme 
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut73 held that while freedom of 
association “is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill 
of Rights,” it is a peripheral First Amendment right.74 Moreover, 
the Court declared “the First Amendment has a penumbra where 
privacy is protected from government[] intrusion.”75 And 
emphasizing its sanctity in relation to free expression, Justice 
Douglas noted that 
[t]he right of “association,” like the right of belief . . . is more than the 
right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one ’s 
attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation 
with it or by other lawful means. Association in that context is a form 
of expression of opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the 
First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express 
guarantees fully meaningful.76 
The right to associate is thus a penumbral right of the First 
Amendment, an “emanation[] from those guarantees [of the Bill 
of Rights] that help give them life and substance.”77 The 
government may, however, punish an individual with 
membership in a particular association, but only if it can make a 
showing that the individual “actively affiliated with a group, 
knowing of its illegal objectives, and with the specific intent to 
further those objectives.”78 
 
patriot groups that engage in violence against undocumented immigrants 
based on their opposition to immigration reform.  
Id.  
 71 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1198 (4th 
ed. 2011).  
 72 David A. Anderson, Jail, Jail, the Gang’s All Here: Senate Crime Bill Section 521, 
The Criminal Street Gang Provision, 36 B.C. L. REV. 527, 529 (1995); Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984).  
 73 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 74 Id. at 482.  
 75 Id. at 483.  
 76 Id. (emphasis added); see also SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR ON 
TERROR AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 212 (2011) (“Civic associations have 
proven indispensable in enabling individuals to stand up to the government in the past 
decade, as they have at other points in our history.”).  
 77 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.  
 78 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 1199.  
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1. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson 
In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,79 the Court 
proclaimed that the of right of freedom of association warranted 
strict scrutiny protection in the face of state coercion requiring 
the NAACP’s Alabama regional office to produce membership 
lists of their “rank-and-file” to the Alabama Attorney General.80 
In Patterson, the state Attorney General sought to enjoin and 
oust the NAACP from operating in Alabama because it was 
allegedly violating an Alabama statute that required foreign (i.e., 
out of state) corporations to file a corporate charter with the 
Secretary of State and designate a place of business for service of 
process.81 When the NAACP refused to comply because it 
believed it fell under an exemption in the state statute, the 
Attorney General obtained a court order against the NAACP, 
forcing it to produce “a large number of the Association’s records 
and papers, including bank statements, leases, deeds, and 
records containing the names and addresses of all Alabama 
‘members’ and ‘agents’ of the Association.”82 After being held in 
civil contempt and assessed a $10,000 fine, the NAACP 
“substantially” complied with the production request, except for 
producing the membership lists, which the Association argued 
was a constitutional violation of their freedoms of speech and 
assembly (as incorporated against the state of Alabama under 
the Fourteenth Amendment).83  
In agreeing with the NAACP, the Court reasoned that “[i]t is 
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the 
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 
‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”84 In applying 
strict scrutiny85 to government action that “may have the effect of 
curtailing the freedom to associate,” the Court highlighted the 
NAACP’s “uncontroverted showing” of the past harmful effects 
members of the Association suffered as a result of revealing their 
 
 79 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).  
 80 Id. at 460, 466.  
 81 Id. at 451–52.  
 82 Id. at 453. 
 83 Id. at 453–54. At this point, the Alabama Circuit Court declared the NAACP in 
continuing contempt and increased the fine to $100,000. Id. at 454.  
 84 Id. at 460 (emphasis added).  
 85 In this test the Supreme Court applies to certain highly protected rights, the 
Court asks whether the governmental action in question is narrowly tailored (or 
necessary) to achieve a compelling government interest. Id. at 460, 463. See generally 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (announcing a new standard of “the 
most rigid scrutiny” for suspect government classifications); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, 
at 554; MILTON R. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOCTRINE 16–18 (2001).  
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rank-and-file members, including “economic reprisal, loss of 
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other 
manifestations of public hostility.”86 The Court held that such 
state action—compelled disclosure of membership lists revealing 
the identities of members and the resulting stigma that came 
with it—was 
likely to affect adversely the ability of [the NAACP] and its members 
to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly 
have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw 
from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of 
fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and 
of the consequences of this exposure.87 
Thus, the Court prioritized the right of individuals as a group to 
be free from government action that targeted them in a manner 
that would cause them to feel reluctant or afraid to continue 
participating in that group, because of the very important right 
at the root of associational rights: free expression and speech. 
2. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees 
Notwithstanding the strength of First Amendment 
protections of the freedom of association, the Court in Roberts 
v. U.S. Jaycees88 still noted that “[t]he right to associate for 
expressive purposes is not, however, absolute.”89 The government 
may infringe on that right if their conduct is justified and 
“serve[s] compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression 
of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly 
less restrictive of associational freedoms.”90 One compelling state 
interest the Court has already recognized is an interest in 
eradicating discrimination.91 Roberts dealt with the U.S. Jaycees, 
a national organization of young men seeking to exclude female 
membership and deny them equal benefits, which allegedly 
violated a Minnesota state statute that prohibited discrimination 
in public accommodation on the basis of race, religion, sex, color, 
creed, disability, or national origin.92  
 
 86 Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460–62. 
 87 Id. at 462–63 (emphasis added). The Court went on to reject the State’s argument 
that those “harmful effects” were merely due to private conduct (i.e., private biases, 
societal prejudices, etc.) not attributable to the state action of compelled production of 
membership lists. Id. at 463. It emphasized that such a distinction is immaterial and that 
“[t]he crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after 
the initial exertion of state power represented by the production order that private action 
takes hold.” Id.  
 88 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).  
 89 Id. at 623.  
 90 Id.  
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 609. 
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The Court held that the state’s goal in fighting historical 
discrimination of minorities and women was a compelling 
interest that did not attempt to suppress any particular message 
of the U.S. Jaycees, and therefore justified state interference in 
forcing the association to allow female members full benefits.93 
Thus, Roberts establishes some limits on the right to the freedom 
of association, namely, that the state may infringe upon the right 
if it can prove: (1) a compelling interest, (2) the state action is 
unrelated to the suppression of the association’s ideas, and 
(3) there is no other less restrictive means of achieving that 
compelling state interest.94 This test will later be applied to the 
government surveillance of Muslim Americans.  
3. Presbyterian Church v. United States 
In 1989, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in the 
affirmative on standing issues regarding the infiltration by the 
Immigration Naturalization Services (INS) of several churches in 
Arizona, upon the suspicion that these churches were harboring 
refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala.95 The plaintiff 
churches in Presbyterian Church v. United States alleged 
violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights due to the 
INS’s covert surveillance and infiltration of churches with agents 
wearing “body bugs” that recorded prayers and church services 
without a warrant or probable cause.96 The allegations regarding 
the government’s violation of First Amendment rights to free 
exercise of religion, speech, and association stemmed from what 
the Court of Appeals concluded were “actual injuries as the result 
of the INS’ conduct.”97  
The churches alleged that, as a result of the INS 
surveillance, the organization suffered from the withdrawal of 
members from active participation in church, a decline in the 
amount of support given to the church, members’ reluctance in 
seeking counseling or being open during prayer, and a diversion 
of the clergies’ time from regular pastoral duties to those related 
to handling the shortfall due to the surveillance.98 News of the 
government infiltration and “bugging” of conversations also left 
congregants with a sense of fear and apprehension that led to a 
distinct impact on their church attendance and morale.99 The 
 
 93 Id. at 623–29.  
 94 Id. at 623; Smith, supra note 24, at 139.  
 95 Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 520 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 96 Id. at 520–21.  
 97 Id. at 521.  
 98 Id. at 521–22.  
 99 Id. at 522.  
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Court of Appeals rejected the INS’s argument that the alleged 
“chilling effect” on the congregants’ religious exercise and 
expression was too speculative and conjectural, and that it did 
not derive from “coercive action” by the government.100 In fact, 
the court held that “[t]he alleged effect on the churches is not a 
mere subjective chill on their worship activities; it is a concrete, 
demonstrable decrease in attendance at those worship activities. 
The injury to the churches is ‘distinct and palpable.’”101  
The court’s analysis here also distinguished Laird 
v. Tatum102 from the case at bar.103 In Laird, the plaintiffs 
alleged injury from the mere “‘existence and operation’” of a 
domestic surveillance program administered by the Army, and 
did not claim a “‘specific present objective harm or threat of 
specific future harm.’”104 While Presbyterian was mostly decided 
on standing issues,105 the plaintiffs would only need to 
substantiate their factual allegations regarding the diminished 
church attendance, cancellation of Bible class, and the diversion 
of clergy time to non-pastoral duties related to handling the 
fallout from the surveillance in order to establish that the INS’s 
surveillance “directly interfered with the churches’ ability to 
carry out their religious mission.”106 Thus, the court set forth as 
persuasive authority the principle that “[c]hurches, as 
organizations, suffer a cognizable injury when assertedly illegal 
government conduct deters their adherents from freely 
participating in religious activities protected by the First 
Amendment.”107  
B.  Muslim American Associational Rights Infringed 
The jurisprudence on associational rights discussed above 
provides a few key methods of first assessing whether 
government conduct rises to the kind of level that merits strict 
 
 100 Id.  
 101 Id. Interestingly, the court also pointed out the idea that the church suffered 
something similar to “reputational” or “professional” harm because of the negative impact 
that knowledge of the INS infiltration had on the church’s image, ability to raise funds, 
and the religious services they offered. Id. at 522–23.  
 102 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).  
 103 Presbyterian, 870 F.2d at 522.  
 104 Laird, 408 U.S. at 9–11; Presbyterian, 870 F.2d at 522.  
 105 See Presbyterian, 870 F.2d at 520–23.  
 106 Id. at 523; Smith, supra note 24, at 143.  
 107 Presbyterian, 870 F.2d at 523. The plaintiffs had pled for, inter alia, injunctive 
relief in the form of a court order prohibiting the INS from continuing the surveillance 
without first showing a compelling interest. Id. at 521. The court went on to note that 
because the criminal prosecution related to the investigation and surveillance was 
already underway, it was unable to assess the likelihood that the churches would be 
subjected to the surveillance again, and therefore remanded that issue to be decided by 
the district court. Id. at 523.  
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scrutiny, and then deciding whether the “compelling interest” 
and “narrowly tailored” elements of the strict scrutiny test itself 
are met. As established by case law, government conduct that 
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate should 
be subjected to strict scrutiny.108 Such “effects” have included 
“economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical 
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”109 The 
Ninth Circuit provided more relevant examples of suppression of 
religious expression, including (1) withdrawal by congregants 
from actively participating, (2) decline in financial support or 
donations, (3) congregants’ reluctance in seeking religious 
counseling or being open during prayer, (4) diversion of clergies’ 
or religious leaders’ time from congregation duties to dealing 
with the effects of surveillance, and (5) fear or apprehension of 
conversations being “bugged” (recorded), which have a negative 
impact on congregants’ morale.110 Muslim American surveillance 
has exhibited similarly chilling effects on mosque-goers, 
demonstrating the need for strict scrutiny application of the 
government programs aimed at widespread Muslim surveillance. 
Like the curtailment the Court found in Patterson, Muslim 
Americans in regions like the East Coast have also suffered from 
the loss of business; diminished or affected employment 
opportunities;111 “other manifestations of public hostility” such as 
stigma;112 and the enabling or furthering justification of hate 
crimes against Muslims113 because of the specter left upon the 
 
 108 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958). 
 109 Id. at 462.  
 110 Presbyterian, 870 F.2d at 521–22. 
 111 MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 30–31 (“Several young, educated [Muslim] 
professionals . . . expressed concern that the public discourse about radicalization within 
Muslim communities, further propagated by the NYPD’s surveillance program, would 
affect their colleagues’ impressions of them. . . . [For example, two] interviewees, both 
young attorneys working at corporate law firms, felt that they could not engage in pro 
bono work on issues relating to Muslim civil rights and Muslim immigrants generally 
because the firm does not want to get entangled (even indirectly) in these controversial 
issues.”).  
 112 Id. at 29 (noting that such state-sponsored targeting of Muslim Americans has 
ingrained stigmatic harm against their community). Muslim Americans “fear that their 
colleagues, neighbors, classmates or customers will view them with suspicion because law 
enforcement has branded them a population ‘of concern’ that is prone to dangerous 
behavior. . . . [This can] contribute to an overall public discourse that is hostile towards 
Muslims.” Id.; see also Susan J. Tabrizi, At What Price? Security, Civil Liberties, and 
Public Opinion in the Age of Terrorism, in AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN AN ERA OF TERRORISM 185, 193–95 (David B. Cohen & John W. Wells eds., 
2004) (discussing American public support for racial profiling based measures to fight 
terrorism in the years after 9/11, such as stopping and questioning “anyone who fits the 
general description of suspected terrorists” and questioning 5000 immigrants from the 
Middle East without more cause than their religion or national origin).  
 113 Mark Potok, FBI Reports Dramatic Spike in Anti-Muslim Hate Violence, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2011, 2:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-potok/ 
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Muslim community in the wake of media reports of NYPD 
surveillance.114 Moreover, the surveillance of Muslims has placed 
a particularly ominous mark on the community through the 
government’s use of informants to infiltrate mosques, Muslim 
Student Associations on college campuses, and the Muslim 
community in general.  
1. The Informant Problem 
The government’s use of informants to infiltrate mosques 
throughout the country is particularly troubling, reminiscent of 
the days of COINTELPRO and the massive distrust the 
government sowed throughout the politically dissident 
community.115 Agencies like the FBI—and by extension local law 
enforcement like the NYPD—have aggressively sought to recruit 
and send informants to mosques to infiltrate Muslim American 
communities, befriend unwitting mosque attendees, Muslim 
community leaders, and even Muslim student organization 
members to record, report, and in many instances, incite violence 
or discussions of violence to see which Muslims will be caught in 
the dragnet.116 Investigative journalist and author Trevor 
Aaronson dedicated years to studying the terrorism prosecutions 
that resulted from the use of government informants.117 
According to data he collected in August 2011, almost ten years 
since 9/11, out of 508 terrorism defendants, “243 had been 
targeted through an FBI informant, 158 had been caught in an 
FBI terrorism sting, and 49 had encountered an agent 
provocateur.”118 By numbers alone, then, during that time period, 
nearly forty-eight percent of the defendants prosecuted for 
 
fbi-reports-dramatic-spik_b_1092996.html; see also GALLUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 40 
(noting that compared to other major national religious groups—Protestant, Catholic, 
Jewish, and Mormon—and people who do not ascribe to a religion, Muslims are most 
likely to have experienced racial or religious discrimination); Interview with Fatima 
Dadabhoy, supra note 33 (highlighting that the prosecution of Muslim Americans through 
what “should be legally considered entrapment” fuels the fire for hate groups to speak in 
favor of such surveillance and prosecutions against Muslims).  
 114 See MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 31 (“By singling out Muslims as 
potentially dangerous, as meriting close law enforcement attention, and by not applying 
the same standards as for other New Yorkers, the NYPD communicates, and perpetuates, 
negative stereotypes about all American Muslims.”) (emphasis added).  
 115 “In fact, the FBI today has ten times as many informants as it did in the 1960s, 
when former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover made the Bureau infamous for inserting spies 
into organizations as varied as Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s and the Ku Klux 
Klan.” AARONSON, supra note 26, at 26; see also id. at 44–45.  
 116 See generally Aziz, supra note 49, at 187–90. The NYPD’s Intelligence Division 
went as far as sending one informant to canvass a white-water river-rafting trip held by a 
Muslim Student Association, because such an activity apparently merited suspicion. 
MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 40.  
 117 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 11–15. 
 118 Id. at 15.  
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terrorism-related crimes had been apprehended by the use of a 
government-sent informant, tasked with setting up—and often 
supplying materials for—a terror plot and bringing the targeted 
individual into the fold of it.119 
The informant stories are all quite similar.120 An FBI 
informant—usually with a checkered past121—is tasked with 
posing as a Muslim with “contacts” to terrorist organizations and 
told to approach certain targets who are often antisocial, almost 
“loner” types with few ties to a community122—and sometimes 
with mental health issues123—to conjure a terror plot that will 
lead to those individuals’ prosecution and conviction.124 Hefty 
financial incentives abound for the informants, who can be paid 
up to $100,000 or more per case, with the added possibility of 
earning tens of thousands more if their operation results in a 
conviction.125 The FBI does not stop there, supplying the 
informants with thousands of dollars at their disposal to offer as 
financial inducements to their targets, thereby increasing the 
likelihood they will get a “prosecutable” case.126 In addition, the 
FBI often uses the vulnerable immigration statuses of some 
Muslims (e.g., an overstayed student visa or undocumented 
status) to coerce or exert immense pressure upon immigrant 
Muslims to become informants in exchange for their immigration 
problems “going away.”127 Such individuals are faced with the 
 
 119 Id. at 234 (“Most of the targets in these stings were poor, uneducated, and easily 
manipulated. In many cases, it’s likely they wouldn’t have come up with the idea at all 
without prodding by one of the FBI’s 15,000 registered informants.”).  
 120 See Sherman, supra note 59, at 1499.  
 121 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 155–80 (discussing the FBI’s use of criminals as 
informants, including—among others—a convicted rapist and child molestor, drug 
dealers, a man on parole for bank fraud, and a suspected murderer).  
 122 Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33.  
 123 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 138, 175–76, 195. 
 124 For a survey of several informant stories that Aaronson and others have argued 
verge on or constitute entrapment, see generally id. at 9–11, 19–24, 31–33, 91–97, 
106−07, 115–35, 137–51; Aziz, supra note 49, at 214–15, 217; MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra 
note 1, at 40–45; Said, supra note 42, at 712–32; Teresa Watanabe & Paloma Esquivel, 
L.A. Area Muslims Say FBI Surveillance Has a Chilling Effect on Their Free Speech and 
Religious Practices, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/01/ 
local/me-muslim1 (discussing infamous infiltration of informant Craig Monteilh into 
mosque communities in Orange County, California and the Muslim community response).  
 125 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 45.  
 126 See id. at 146, 148, 177, 187 (describing, for example, how during one operation, 
an informant paid for the targeted individuals’ rent, offered to buy one target a 
barbershop, and was authorized by the FBI to offer $5000 to each of the four recruited 
men to stage a terrorist plot); see also Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33 
(noting one case where an informant in his thirties befriended two young converts in their 
early twenties, bought them laptops, and paid them to participate in a terrorist plot).  
 127 For accounts of some ways the FBI has used immigration status or threats of 
deportation to strong arm individuals into becoming informants, see AARONSON, supra 
note 26, at 91–93, 98–101; see also Said, supra note 42, at 710. According to renowned 
immigration law expert Ira Kurzban, “‘It’s clearly the modus operandi of the FBI to (a) 
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“choice” of either being deported, or, if they refuse, being 
prosecuted for terrorism crimes themselves.128 Even Muslim 
Americans with lawful status are approached by the FBI to 
become informants and threatened with being placed on the 
no-fly list and barred from commercial air travel.129 
The lengths to which the FBI has gone and is apparently 
willing to go to keep the informant system in place—despite its 
legally dubious nature—shows how adamant the agency is in 
employing morally suspect informants to catch would-be 
terrorists in terror plots orchestrated by the FBI.130 Also 
troubling is the fabrication of reports by informants that are later 
used in prosecuting the suspected terrorists who were the targets 
of such operations all along.131 But perhaps most disconcerting is 
the FBI’s heavy hand in, as Aaronson argues, “manufacturing” 
these terror plots in order to implicate an easy target into taking 
the blame. Prosecuting someone and placing them behind bars 
creates palpable, tangible evidence the Bureau can point to as 
proof they are doing their job.132 In fact, during the 2011 
“Newburgh Four” sentencing of four ill-equipped and 
impressionable men who were walked through the steps of a 
terrorism plot with an experienced FBI informant, presiding U.S. 
District Judge Colleen McMahon noted:  
“The essence of what occurred here is that the government, 
understandably zealous to protect its citizens from terrorism, came 
upon a man both bigoted and suggestible, one who was incapable of 
committing an act of terrorism on his own . . . . [The government] 
created acts of terrorism out of his fantasies of bravado and bigotry, 
and then made those fantasies come true . . . . I suspect real terrorists 
 
recruit people who are going to be informants and (b) to use whatever leverage they can to 
get them to be informants.’” AARONSON, supra note 26, at 99.  
 128 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 91–98.  
 129 See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, In Lawsuit, American Muslims Claim FBI Used No-Fly 
List to Bully Them, NPR (Apr. 23, 2014, 2:33 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2014/04/23/306223445/in-lawsuit-american-muslims-claim-fbi-used-no-fly-list-to-bull 
y-them; AARONSON, supra note 26, at 103–05. 
 130 See AARONSON, supra note 26, at 106 (noting the FBI told informant Craig 
Monteilh to dig up any information that could be used to pressure Muslims into becoming  
informants, including immigration status issues, criminal activity, drug use, and 
extramarital affairs and sanctioned his engagement in sexual relationships with women 
to “engender trust” with people); see also Complaint, supra note 3, at 8–9. For a detailed 
overview of major cases Human Rights Watch studied, looking at the kinds of “inciting 
tactics” used by informants against their targets, see generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 59, at 23–26 (noting, among other tactics, an informant sending one target 
websites and photographs of human rights abuses of Muslims, including a young Iraqi 
girl’s rape by an American and children mangled, decapitated, or burned alive).  
 131 See Said, supra note 42, at 726–27 & n.245 (describing how “wholly fabricated” 
words and “routinely exaggerated” reports by one informant served as the basis of one 
FBI case that led to a fifteen year prison sentence).  
 132 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 234.  
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would not have bothered themselves with a person who was so utterly 
inept . . . . Only the government could have made a terrorist out of Mr. 
Cromitie [the primary defendant], whose buffoonery is positively 
Shakespearean in scope.”133 
She went on to say, “I believe beyond a shadow of a doubt 
that there would have been no crime here except the government 
instigated it, planned it and brought it to fruition.”134 As Judge 
McMahon so succinctly put it, the reality is that the government 
can make a terrorist out of even the most unassuming and 
incompetent individuals, which bears a striking resemblance to 
classic entrapment cases like United States v. Hollingsworth.135 
While a full discussion on the legality and utility of 
informants is beyond the scope of this Comment, the effects of 
government informants on the Muslim American community is 
particularly relevant to Muslims’ right to freedom of association. 
Aside from the ramifications of distrust and suspicion that such 
use of informants has on the Muslim community, sending 
informants amongst Muslim groups—whether they are mosques 
or Muslim Student Associations—“may . . . interfer[e] with a 
group’s expressive association merely by occupying membership 
positions for reasons other than furthering the group’s goals.”136 
Informant infiltration has sent waves through Muslim American 
communities throughout the country, and understandably so.137 
It breeds fear amongst individual Muslims, who are forced to 
 
 133 Id. at 150 (quoting U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon). Judge McMahon 
sentenced the defendants to twenty-five years in prison, the minimum allowed under 
federal guidelines, refusing to order life in prison, which the government had sought. Id. 
at 150–51; Graham Rayman, Newburgh 4 Terror Case: Judge Sentences Three to 25 Years 
in Prison, U.S. Constitution Shivers, VILLAGE VOICE (June 29, 2011, 3:33 PM), http:// 
blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2011/06/newburgh_4_terr_3.php. For an account of 
the FBI informant’s pursuit of Cromitie as a potential terrorist target and the progression 
of the terrorism scheme, see Paul Harris, Newburgh Four: Poor, Black, and Jailed Under 
FBI ‘Entrapment’ Tactics, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2011/dec/12/newburgh-four-fbi-entrapment-terror, and AARONSON, supra note 26, at 
137−51.  
 134 Harris, supra note 133. 
 135 U.S. v. Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d 593, 595–96, 599–600 (7th Cir. 1993), aff’d en banc, 
27 F.3d 1196, 1199–200 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Said, supra note 42, at 697–98 (“[T]he 
government creates a serious risk of inducing crime when it provides the means for 
individuals to carry out crimes that they otherwise would not have been able to commit.”).  
 136 Smith, supra note 24, at 148. Smith describes the usual trajectory that comes from 
the aftermath of the informant’s infiltration: “Once the alleged plot is complete, and the 
government prosecutes the individuals involved, members become suspicious of each 
other, attendance declines, and individuals become reluctant to discuss religious or 
political issues.” Id.  
 137 See, e.g., Watanabe & Esquivel, supra note 124; H.G. Reza, New Fears in Muslim 
Community Follow Reports of U.S. Monitoring, L.A. TIMES (May 29, 2008), http://articles. 
latimes.com/2008/may/29/local/me-mosques29; FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
RETHINKING RADICALIZATION 21–23 (2011), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/f737 
600b433d98d25e_6pm6beukt.pdf.  
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wonder whether their Muslim neighbor, new friend from the 
Muslim Student Association, or person praying next to them at 
the mosque is actually an informant.138 For example, one report 
on the NYPD surveillance of Muslims found that “[n]early all 
interviewees thought they knew someone who was an informant 
or an undercover officer.”139 Whether or not they were right is 
beside the point. Only one religious group, Muslim Americans, in 
the greater New York City area admitted that they knew or 
thought they knew of an individual who was specifically sent by 
their local law enforcement to their mosque or religious 
community simply to track their movements and record and 
report on their statements to find and prosecute terrorists. This 
shows the disproportionate burden placed on American Muslims 
today.140 
The actions of the government have created a climate of 
suspicion amongst the Muslim American community. In the 
wake of reports of informant Craig Monteilh infiltrating Orange 
County mosques in Southern California, Hussam Ayloush, 
Executive Director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations 
(CAIR) in Los Angeles, stated in 2010 that “[e]very Muslim I 
know just assumes that the person praying next to them is an 
informant.”141 Much like the observations of Imam Raza,142 
religious leader of the Brooklyn mosque and named plaintiff in 
the 2013 lawsuit, “[i]n mosques around the country, newcomers 
are met with a suspicion that didn’t exist before 9/11—a 
particularly sad state of affairs, as for centuries mosques had 
 
 138 Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33 (“When cases like these break, it 
doesn’t just impact the defendant or even his family. It impacts the whole community, 
because all those who know that individual are then approached by the FBI to get more 
information from them about themselves and about the defendant.”).  
 139 MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 26.  
 140 In Presbyterian, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held: “When congregants are 
chilled from participating in worship activities, when they refuse to attend church 
services because they fear the government is spying on them and taping their every 
utterance . . . we think a church suffers organizational injury because its ability to carry 
out its ministries has been impaired.” Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 
518, 522 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 141 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 112; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 59, 
at 23 (“Some of the cases we reviewed appear to have begun as virtual fishing expeditions, 
where the FBI had no basis to suspect a particular individual of a propensity to commit 
terrorist acts. In those cases, the informant identified a specific target by randomly 
initiating conversations near a mosque. Assigned to raise controversial religious and 
political topics, these informants probed their targets’ opinions on politically sensitive and 
nuanced subjects, sometimes making comments that appeared designed to inflame the 
targets. If a target’s opinions were deemed sufficiently troubling, officials concerned with 
nascent radicalization pushed the sting operation forward.”). Given the backdrop of an 
environment like this, it is no wonder that Muslim Americans attending a mosque would 
reasonably fear that the person who just came up to speak with them may in fact be an 
informant, casting out his net for potential sting operation leads.  
 142 See supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text.  
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been considered welcoming places for strangers and travelers, a 
tradition that dates back to . . . the earliest days of Islam.”143  
2. Self-Censorship of Religious and Political Expression 
According to civil rights attorney Fatima Dadabhoy, Muslim 
religiosity has become a reason for closer government scrutiny. 
Based on questions FBI agents pose in “voluntary interviews,” it 
is as if “just the act of going to a mosque and being religious is 
suspicious.”144 Questions such as “What mosque do you go to?” 
“How often do you to go the mosque?” and “What made you 
decide to become religious?” are commonly asked by the FBI and 
are apparently meant to gauge the level of the individual’s 
“suspiciousness.”145 Such forms of surveillance and intelligence 
gathering have resulted in what the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals called a “withdrawal” of mosque attendees. 
In 2009, after news broke of Craig Monteilh, the notorious 
FBI informant who infiltrated mosques and Muslim communities 
in Orange County, California, many Muslims in the area simply 
stopped attending their mosque, unable to partake in and receive 
their religious services out of fear that the FBI would spy on 
them too.146 Donations at the Islamic Center of Norco in Corona, 
California declined thirty to fifty percent in the years leading up 
to the revelation of the informant, which was attributed in part 
to the economy’s decline, but also to the very real consequences of 
prosecutions under the “material support” statute.147 
In 2011, when Associated Press investigative reporting 
revealed the NYPD surveillance of Muslims and the existence of 
a pervasive informant named Shamiur Rahman, “[there was] a 
steep decline in mosque attendance, as the number of 
worshippers attending afternoon prayers on 
weekdays . . . declined from approximately twenty people to just 
 
 143 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 112. 
 144 Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 59, at 18–19 (noting the FBI’s use of “voluntary interviews” and events 
presented as “community outreach” to gather information from American Muslims, 
further fueling the Muslim American community’s fears and distrust of law enforcement). 
 145 Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33; see also MAPPING MUSLIMS, 
supra note 1, at 12 (noting that due to NYPD surveillance, “attendance at a mosque—a 
religious duty for many Muslims—has become tantamount to placing oneself on law 
enforcement’s radar”); AARONSON, supra note 26, at 53 (discussing how an FBI training 
manual released by Wired magazine instructed that “[t]he more devout a Muslim 
was . . . the more likely he was to be violent”). Such “radicalization theories” have been 
largely debunked in Patel’s report. See generally PATEL, supra note 137, at 3–18.  
 146 Watanabe & Esquivel, supra note 124.  
 147 Id. (“Since 9/11, federal authorities have also shut down at least six of the Muslim 
community’s major charitable organizations, accusing them of involvement in terrorist 
financing.”); see also Reza, supra note 137; 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012).  
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two or three people.”148 With news of such informant operations, 
some Muslim Americans have become much more wary of what 
they say in the presence of others, out of fear it will be recorded 
or misconstrued in a manner that can incriminate them.149 In 
fact, even speaking Urdu or Arabic in public could prompt 
surveillance.150 Muslim business owners, who have also been 
targeted, are affirmatively censoring what TV programming is 
shown in their establishment and what kinds of discussions are 
had there.151 To some, it is a frustrating result of sweeping 
generalizations, a burden Muslims have to shoulder simply 
because of the religion they belong to.152 What makes their 
situation even more challenging is the fact that Muslim 
Americans are so afraid they do not even wish to speak out 
openly against the surveillance leveled against them, lest they 
come on the government’s radar or trigger even more scrutiny for 
their actions.153 Such effects of government surveillance have 
resulted in the kind of fear and apprehension that the church 
members in Presbyterian felt upon learning that government 
agents were infiltrating their churches wearing “body bugs” and 
recording conversations.154  
Moreover, just like the clergy in Presbyterian who were 
diverted away from their religious duties in order to deal with 
the effects of the surveillance on their congregants,155 mosque 
leaders like Imam Raza have had to divert time away from their 
responsibilities to their congregation to handle the fallout in 
 
 148 Complaint, supra note 3, at 15. See Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 
F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The alleged effect on the churches is not a mere subjective 
chill on their worship activities; it is a concrete, demonstrable decrease in attendance at 
those worship activities.”).  
 149 MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 18. One New York area Sunday school teacher 
stated, “I have to think twice about the sentences I say just in case someone can come up 
with a different meaning to what I’m saying.” Id.  
 150 Id. at 20. 
 151 Id. In a feat of illustrative irony, leaked NYPD documents showed that the law 
enforcement agency already knew that one Muslim business owner stopped showing 
Al-Jazeera on his television because he did not want to bring unwanted attention from the 
government. Id. at 22. It appears his attempts were in vain.  
 152 One Muslim woman felt caught in a Catch-22: “When your speech is limited, you 
can’t really do much: you can’t write on the internet, you can’t talk on the phone because 
they’re tapped, you can’t speak in public.” Id. at 23; see also Complaint, supra note 3, at 
13.   
 153 MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 41 (noting some Muslim Student Associations 
implemented bans on political discussions to prevent further surveillance). For a personal 
account of the NYPD surveillance experience from a New York University Muslim law 
student, see Elizabeth Dann, Singling Us Out: NYPD’s Spying on Muslim Americans 
Creates Fear and Distrust, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.ac 
lu.org/blog/racial-justice-national-security-religion-belief/singling-us-out-nypds-spying-mu 
slim-americans.  
 154 See Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 155 Id. 
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their membership caused by the government surveillance. For 
example, Raza purchased a professional camera and three 
external hard drives to save the videos of sermons he gave, in 
order to have proof of his own words in case he would need to 
defend himself if his words were taken out of context—all of 
which cost the mosque about $2200.156 He has had to devote 
hours to mediate conflicts that arise between mosque 
congregants about the suspicion and distrust that has come 
between some due to informant infiltration.157 Thus, the 
government’s conduct within the sphere of surveillance in the 
name of counterterrorism has caused a “distinct and palpable”158 
chilling effect upon the Muslim American community and their 
freedom of association. 
3. Applying the Roberts Strict Scrutiny Test to Surveillance 
of Muslim Americans 
Under the strict scrutiny test as applied here, (1) the 
government purpose for the surveillance must be compelling, 
(2) it must be unrelated to the suppression of ideas, and (3) there 
must be no other less restrictive means of achieving that 
purpose.159 First, while gross injustices have been carried out 
against racial minorities in the name of national security, the 
Court has repeatedly held that national security is a compelling 
interest that would suffice the “purpose” prong of the strict 
scrutiny test.160 It cannot be denied that the true costs of life, 
limb, stability, and security that come from terrorism of all forms 
are serious and tragic. They warrant true vigilance and swift 
action by authorities when a pressing danger presents itself. 
While the debates about the existence of “real” national security 
 
 156 Complaint, supra note 3, at 10–11.   
 157 Id. at 15. 
 158 Presbyterian, 807 F.2d at 522 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).  
 159 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); see supra notes 85, 88–94 and 
accompanying text. 
 160 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944) (upholding 
Japanese and Japanese American internment for national security threats in World War 
II); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 305 (1981) (“The Court recognized that the legitimacy of 
the objective of safeguarding our national security is ‘obvious and inarguable.’”) (citing 
Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 
507, 509 n.3 (1980) (“The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the 
secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of 
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service.”). 
But see United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 
313 (1972) (“National security cases . . . often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth 
Amendment values not present in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime. Though the investigative duty 
of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to 
constitutionally protected speech.”); Parker, supra note 38, at 162 (“Too often in our 
history unfounded suspicions based on free association have led to intrusive forms of 
unwarranted domestic information collection in the name of national security.”). 
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issues161 are outside the scope of this discussion, if the 
government’s asserted purpose in the widespread surveillance of 
Muslim Americans, informant infiltration, and sting operations 
is national security, past precedent has established that such a 
purpose is, indeed, compelling.  
Second, while the government may argue that its purpose or 
intention with the surveillance is not to dissuade expression, the 
reality is that it is still having a concrete impact on Muslim 
American expression. Nonetheless, absent facts indicating 
otherwise, this analysis will operate upon the assumed 
presumption that the government’s purpose was not related to an 
intent to actually dissuade expression.  
Third, and finally, this leaves the primary issue: whether the 
government’s methods are truly narrowly tailored. The Court has 
held that “even though the governmental purpose be legitimate 
and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that 
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be 
more narrowly achieved.”162 The means used here have consisted 
of sweeping, undiscerning surveillance; the targeting of the 
Muslim American community; and the act of doing so without 
articulable suspicion or probable cause, other than the 
observation that the group targeted belongs to—or appears to 
belong to—the Islamic faith.  
As many have argued,163 the government need not use such 
sweeping methods of law enforcement to achieve their goal of 
counterterrorism. In fact, these approaches have proved 
counterproductive, and instead have led to significant backlash 
from the Muslim American community itself, which feels 
suspicious and distrustful of the government.164 This, in turn, has 
 
 161 See generally HERMAN, supra note 76, at 207 (discussing how during Korematsu, 
the government withheld facts in the report provided to the Supreme Court of the United 
States in order to establish that a “national security” threat existed).  
 162 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (declaring unconstitutional a state law 
requiring all teachers to annually disclose their group memberships).  
 163 See, e.g., Aziz, supra note 49, at 222–23 (asserting that current counterterrorism 
methods subordinate Muslim Americans by targeting them unnecessarily); Atif 
Choudhury, Confessions of a Former Muslim Students Association Board Member, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 25, 2014, 2:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/atif-choud 
hury/confessions-muslims-students-association_b_4863368.html (“Categorically bugging 
all mosques and ‘infiltrating’ [Muslim Student Associations] might be the quick and easy 
option for our government to show us that it is ‘doing something’ to combat terror, but is it 
really the most optimal method for serious law enforcement?”).  
 164 Muslim Americans have the lowest confidence in the FBI, compared to other 
major national religious groups (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Mormon) and those who do 
not have a religion. GALLUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 24; see also Aziz, supra note 49, at 
198 (“When coupled with multiple discoveries that informants have induced young 
Muslim men with diminished mental capacity or financial problems toward violence, it 
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shut off the possibility of fruitful cooperation amongst the 
government and the Muslim American community, because they 
constantly feel treated as a suspect class, rather than a 
productive, equal partner.165 As Part III will discuss, there are 
many other means the government can employ that are less 
restrictive than the ones currently in place.  
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: OPTIMISTIC, BUT REALISTIC 
As discussed in Parts I and II, the government’s current 
methods of fighting domestic terrorism are exceeding 
constitutional bounds because they are not narrowly tailored to 
achieving the goal of fighting domestic terrorism. While much 
has been discussed about the problems that the government’s 
methods pose,166 articulating solutions for this issue is 
particularly difficult, given the varied and competing interests of 
all the players involved.167 Thus, it may be fruitful to step outside 
the traditional bounds of this discussion to seek possible 
solutions from other contexts. At the heart of the government’s 
concern here is domestic terrorism. Analyzing the government’s 
domestic counterterrorism strategies through the lens of gang 
injunction and gang intervention models in the United States 
proves illuminating in understanding what methods, articulated 
goals, and types of administration have been effective—or at 
least promising—and which have been detrimental.  
Before embarking on this analysis, however, it should be 
noted that while there are some common themes between both, 
domestic terrorism and gang violence also have their obvious 
differences.168 On the one hand, the problem of gang violence in 
 
should come as no surprise that some Muslim communities are distrustful of state and 
federal law enforcement agencies[] . . . .”).  
 165 PATEL, supra note 137, at 29–31 (urging the repudiation of prior biases regarding 
Muslim “radicalization”); MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 46–47 (describing boycotts 
and protests in response to NYPD surveillance); Aziz, supra note 49, at 223 (“[A]s they 
beseech their government to respect their civil liberties, Muslims must also seek the 
protection of law enforcement against private acts of violence and discrimination. For 
many Muslims, the government may come across as more foe than friend.”). 
 166 See supra notes 49–70 and accompanying text. 
 167 E.g., Muslim Americans, Muslim community leaders, local law enforcement, and 
the federal government to name a few. 
 168 Interestingly, there was a case in New York where gang violence was prosecuted 
under an anti-terrorism statute. In 2012, a gang member who shot and wounded another 
rival gang member to avenge his friend’s death also accidentally shot and killed a 
ten-year-old girl. Glenn Greenwald, New York’s Top Court Highlights the Meaninglessness 
and Menace of the Term ‘Terrorism’, GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2012, 6:36 AM), http://www.the 
guardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/16/court-terrorism-morales-gangs-meaningless. In 
People v. Morales, the gang member was prosecuted and found guilty at the trial court 
level under an anti-terrorism statute. Id. The New York Court of Appeals overturned the 
conviction. Id.  
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the United States is similar to domestic terrorism due to both of 
their troubling potential to cause loss of life and disruption of 
social stability. Both threats often also come from those 
individuals who are, or feel, marginalized by society.169 However, 
both phenomena are different in that gang violence is more 
embedded within the fabric of daily life in many urban centers of 
the United States, such that its effects are largely localized; 
while threats of terrorism are more sporadic or intermittent, 
unpredictable, and have a wider effect on a national—and even 
international—level.170 Nonetheless, the most common thread 
between the two issues is how the government has attempted to 
address them and the challenges they each pose, not only to law 
enforcement, but also those communities most affected by it. This 
Comment presents two recommendations: First, there should be 
end to the constitutionally suspect practice of surveillance of 
Muslim Americans without prior evidence of wrongdoing because 
this method is not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling 
interest of national security. Second, to address those individuals 
who have found themselves feeling marginalized by society, the 
Muslim American community could implement grassroots 
“intervention” or “prevention” programs for individuals who 
exhibit signs of potentially going down a path of violence because 
they lack access to proper resources to address the sources of 
their marginalization.  
A.  Cease Widespread Surveillance of Muslim Americans 
The government—both federal and local—should stop the 
practice of widespread, suspicionless surveillance of Muslim 
Americans in the form of mosque infiltration and informant sting 
operations. Community and grassroots activists, legal civil rights 
groups, and Muslim American leaders are all calling for the end 
of such a practice.171 Choosing to spy on Muslims simply because 
 
 169 See, e.g., Irving A. Spergel, Youth Gangs: Continuity and Change, 12 CRIME 
& JUST. 171, 259 (1990) (noting that in particular, youths become gang members to 
“develop[] alternate social, cultural, and economic sub-systems to meet common human 
needs in an increasingly complex urban society”); Thomas A. Myers, Note, The 
Unconstitutionality, Ineffectiveness, and Alternatives of Gang Injunctions, 14 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 285, 302 (2009) (quoting the Sergeant of the Washington D.C. Police 
Department as stating that the root of the gang violence problem is a social one).   
 170 E.g., drive-by shooting on a street corner targeting local individuals versus a 
bombing in a large public place targeting many and prompting national and international 
attention. 
 171 See MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 50–51 (calling for the end of “blanket 
surveillance of the Muslim population of New York City and its environs”); Noa Yachot, 
NYPD Shutters Muslim Mapping Unit – But What About Other Tactics?, AM. 
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 15, 2014, 7:01 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-
security-religion-belief/nypd-shutters-muslim-spying-unit-what-about-its-tactics (noting 
discriminatory surveillance practices that still exist after the NYPD officially disbanded 
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they are Muslim and attend a mosque is based upon a faulty172 
and invidious presumption that terrorist threats only come from 
Muslims, and namely those Muslims who are more “religious.”173 
Such a presumption must be retracted in order for the 
government’s approach to be narrowly tailored. Moreover, the 
current surveillance techniques have not proved effective in 
achieving their stated goals. In 2012, Assistant Chief Thomas 
Galati of the NYPD himself attested under oath that during the 
more than six years of its implementation, the surveillance 
program did not yield a single lead, nor did it spark the need to 
initiate any terror investigations.174 There are also limits to how 
useful a tool surveillance can be for crime prevention.175 
Myers argues that gang injunctions, which literally 
criminalize associative behaviors such as walking down the 
street or riding in a car with another individual who is suspected 
to be a gang member, are unconstitutional for the same reasons 
that Muslim surveillance is: there are other reasonable 
alternatives to achieving the government’s goal of fighting gang 
violence.176 The criteria that law enforcement use to label 
someone a gang member has been seen as too subjective, 
arbitrary, and burdensome of expressive rights, such as the 
ability to wear a certain colored t-shirt, sport a tattoo, or speak 
with another person on the street.177 These are much like the 
 
its Muslim mapping unit); Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33 (proposing as 
part of the solution that the Muslim American community not be treated as a suspect 
class).  
 172 In the United States, compared to other major religious groups (Protestant, 
Catholic, Jewish, and Mormon) and those with no religion, Muslim Americans are the 
most likely to reject violence through individual attacks on civilians. GALLUP REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 31. 
 173 In fact, frequent mosque attendance and a strong religious identity are associated 
with greater civic engagement and emotional health among Muslim Americans. Id. at 44; 
see also Aziz, supra note 49, at 182. 
 174 Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, Terror 
Cases, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 21, 2012, available at http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-
The-News/2012/NYPD-Muslim-spying-led-to-no-leads-terror-cases.  
 175 Bell & Webster, supra note 50, at 24 (“Surveillance can only anticipate up to a 
point, and in some very limited circumstances. Searchable databases and international 
communications interception were fully operational on September 10 to no avail. The 
likely result will be that internal surveillance of citizens by the state will increase.”); see 
also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 59, at 22 (quoting former FBI agent Michael 
German) (“Today’s terrorism sting operations reflect a significant departure from past 
practice. When the FBI undercover agent or informant is the only purported link to a real 
terrorist group, supplies the motive, designs the plot, and provides all the weapons, one 
has to question whether they are combatting terrorism or creating it. Aggrandizing the 
terrorist threat with these theatrical productions only spreads public fear and divides 
communities, which doesn’t make anyone safer.”). 
 176 Myers, supra note 169, at 303.  
 177 Id. Those who were labeled as gang members are disproportionately low income, 
young, and people of color, which has led to “the criminalization of the[ir] daily lives.” 
Beth Caldwell, Criminalizing Day-to-Day Life: A Socio-legal Critique of Gang Injunctions, 
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“indicators” law enforcement use to label Muslims as terrorist 
threats because of their garb, physical appearance, or political 
ideologies. Thus, Myers’s call for “[t]ighter and more definite 
standards, like beyond a reasonable doubt” for law enforcement 
to meet before subjecting an individual to closer scrutiny within 
the gang injunction context also applies to Muslim 
surveillance.178 In the early 1990s, Irving A. Spergel, an expert 
on gangs, also suggested that gang intervention programs for 
youth should focus on those who “are already engaged in 
law-violating behaviors.”179 The latter idea is key in 
implementing a successful approach, for then it means the 
government’s method will truly be narrowly tailored to achieve 
the government’s national security interest. Such a standard, 
albeit simple, does not infringe upon free exercise, association, or 
speech rights, but still does offer a basic minimum standard to 
follow, creating something closer to a “bright line” rule. 
Approaches such as the ones suggested for the gang context may 
equally apply to the Muslim surveillance issue, for the 
government should operate upon more than an individual’s mere 
adherence to Islam to target them. This will also be more 
narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s purpose of 
protecting against domestic terrorism, because it will attempt to 
target real criminals, rather than everyday mosque congregants.  
B.  Muslim American Community-Based Intervention Programs 
The final proposition involves controversial and constantly 
changing attitudes about how to address crime by using “the 
community” as a vehicle for counterterrorism. The government’s 
decision to conduct mosque surveillance and infiltration of 
Muslim groups—along with the slew of prosecutions that have 
resulted from such programs—has left Muslim Americans feeling 
wary of who to trust in their own communities and, more 
particularly, in the government.180 While many law enforcement 
branches have community relations liaisons to attempt to 
 
37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 241, 243 (2010). This is strikingly similar to the effect NYPD 
surveillance had on the daily lives of Muslim Americans. See generally supra Part I.  
 178 Myers, supra note 169, at 303–04.  
 179 Spergel, supra note 169, at 262 (emphasis added). 
 180 Muslim Americans are afraid of providing information directly to the FBI due to 
its aggressive use of informants, and instead prefer to provide information to civil rights 
groups like CAIR, which then relay it to the government. AARONSON, supra note 26, at 
113; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 59, at 20 (noting that the FBI justifies its 
“domain mapping” program “by arguing that ‘terrorist and criminal groups target ethnic 
and geographic communities for victimization and/or recruitment’”).  The Human Rights 
Watch report concludes that such an “approach to investigation is discriminatory and 
counterproductive, undermining trust in authorities in precisely the communities where 
law enforcement claims to want to build that trust.” Id.  
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collaborate and forge ties with groups such as Muslim 
Americans, much of these attempts by law enforcement have 
been viewed with skepticism by Muslim American leaders.181 
In the context of American gangs, Spergel has suggested 
creating collaborative agencies consisting of many key players, 
such as local government agencies, law enforcement, and 
community groups, to address the issues of gang violence 
through gang intervention.182 However optimistic the idea 
sounds, the reality is that many conflicts arise with such a 
multi-faceted body of groups attempting to work together, 
because although they are all united in the cause of addressing 
the same issue, they each may have decidedly different, if not 
sometimes conflicting, interests.183 That is not to say, however, 
that the gang intervention model is not a useful tool in 
addressing true potential “at-risk” individuals. Currently, when 
law enforcement, through its channels of intelligence, finds an 
individual who appears susceptible to going down a path of 
potential violence due to mental health, economic, or social 
factors, rather than intervening to direct them to help, law 
enforcement sends them an informant, who hatches a 
prosecutable terror plot, which lands that individual in prison. 
Not only does this exploit and permanently damage the 
individual’s future, it does not really fight true terrorist threats. 
This Comment proposes that instead of swooping in to 
prosecute that individual, that person should be directed to the 
proper services and resources to address the underlying issues 
that placed this individual in such a position in the first place.184 
 
 181 See, e.g., MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 36–37 (discussing how NYPD 
outreach efforts are counterproductive because they operate on the premise that all the 
Muslims they interact with need to be “de-radicalized”); Aziz, supra note 49, at 150–52 
(arguing that community policing “co-opts” Muslim American leaders into gathering 
intelligence on their fellow Muslims because the government would not be able to 
constitutionally reach such information); Jessica Garrison, Counter-Terrorism Becomes 
Part of Law Enforcement, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/ 
06/nation/la-na-911-homeland-security-enforcement-20110907/2 (noting concerns by some 
officials that the LAPD’s counterterrorism department trainings were spreading 
misinformation and false rumors about how Muslim Americans wanted to impose 
Shari’ah law the United States).   
 182 Spergel, supra note 169, at 261. He also suggested it be run by an official agency 
with law enforcement or other rehabilitative or educational functions. Id. 
 183 E.g., the FBI or local law enforcement may feel the need to justify its budget and 
seek to aggressively prosecute suspected Muslims of terror crimes, while Muslim 
community leaders may seek to avoid making their members more vulnerable to already 
targeted scrutiny by refusing to give any information about their congregation. See 
AARONSON, supra note 26, at 113.  
 184 See Choudhury, supra note 163 (“Would not a smarter more effective use of our 
law enforcement resources be to work with Muslim communities and organizations to 
help identify these outliers rather than treating ‘existing while openly Muslim’ as a 
crime?”). 
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Such a plan of action would be a remarkable improvement upon 
the current sense of distrust that exists between the Muslim 
community and law enforcement. To address the problems of 
gang violence, Myers suggested as an alternative to gang 
injunctions social programs providing employment, education, 
and even recreation opportunities to “would-be” gang 
members.185 Such “prevention” or “intervention” programs would 
aim to keep “would-be” gang members from following that path, 
and similarly could allow law enforcement and community 
relations to soften.186 
Myers’s suggested gang intervention model fits quite well 
into the Muslim American community context. As can be seen 
from the stories Aaronson chronicled,187 the individuals 
prosecuted for terrorism are precisely those “would-be” terrorists 
who are more likely to suffer from mental, social, or emotional 
problems than pose a real terrorist threat. One important 
distinction, however, persists. It would be more fruitful to have 
those social services programs provided from the “ground up” by 
grassroots Muslim American community organizations. Their 
presence would be a welcome sight to many Muslims who have 
felt they have been treated as a suspect class for years. 
Additionally, it would still help law enforcement accomplish its 
goals of diminishing the threat of potential terrorism-related 
violence, because such programs would reach out to the—as 
Aaronson coins it—“wannabe” terrorists who, in reality, likely 
need mental health counseling or social programs, not 
prosecution and jail time.188 While there is no way for such 
organizations to reach out to all these individuals—who are often 
social outcasts outside the circle of a mosque or other 
community—for those they can serve, such an effort would be 
welcome relief from prosecution and imprisonment, cataclysmic 
events that send waves through an entire community, not just 
the defendant’s family and friends.  
Perhaps most importantly, such a project could prove 
particularly empowering to the Muslim American community, 
which has experienced years of political and social 
“subordination.”189 Unlike the kind of community policing Aziz 
 
 185 Myers, supra note 169, at 305. 
 186 Id. (“If would-be gang members are employed at a job, at an after-school program, 
or are engaged in a recreational program[,] . . . then they will not be on the streets 
engaging in violent gang activity.”). 
 187 See supra notes 120–135 and accompanying text. 
 188 See supra notes 120–135 and accompanying text. 
 189 Aziz, supra note 49, at 177–78 (“Subordination theory posits that particular 
groups are racialized into the outsider ‘Other’ deserving of harsh treatment by the state to 
protect the majority from a perceived threat. These ‘out-groups’ disproportionately carry 
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describes and wholly refutes,190 this campaign would not be 
instigated by government intervention, but rather would be 
inspired by its own local Muslim communities that would seek to 
provide social services to its community members. The only law 
enforcement role present here would be its lack of a role, in that 
it should refrain from targeting and prosecuting such vulnerable 
individuals, along with implementing the suggested methods of 
narrowing their surveillance methods to only those whose actions 
constitute illegal conduct. 
This model, based on the current realities of the Muslim 
American experience, is cognizant of the discriminatory policies 
and practices in place that perpetuate and erroneously conflate 
terrorism and Islam. The only way society can move away from 
such stigmatic stereotypes of an entire religious class is to firmly 
reject such biased presumptions, in order to stop government 
practices of de facto discrimination that offend the constitutional 
principles of free exercise, speech, and association. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the government has proffered the compelling 
interest of national security as a justification for its widespread 
network of surveillance and informants for the purpose of 
essentially monitoring Muslim American daily life, the means it 
has employed are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive 
strict scrutiny in the face of constitutional First Amendment 
protections of free association and speech. This has led to a 
significant “chilling” of religious and political expression, as well 
as the curtailment of actual religious activities such as mosque 
attendance, donations for charity, or participation in a Muslim 
Student Association on college campuses. Through the refining of 
the government’s scope of surveillance, and the creation of 
objective, transparent criteria for individuals who do warrant 
such government scrutiny, Muslim Americans can be secured 
their fundamental rights, while still allowing law enforcement to 
accomplish its goal of fighting actual terrorism. Additionally, the 
government should not prosecute those vulnerable, and easily 
susceptible individuals who were unsuspectingly caught in the 
government “dragnet” of informant sting operations. Instead, law 
enforcement should allow the Muslim American community its 
own space to address the issue on its own terms, by offering such 
individuals social programs and mental health services as 
 
the burden of distributional inequalities arising from abusive practices sanctioned by the 
majority.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 190 Id. at 213–17. 
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needed, without fear of government scrutiny or prosecution. This 
will not only empower Muslim Americans, a community largely 
marginalized post 9/11, but also allow them to mold their own 
destinies in this nation. It is not the place of a government based 
on fundamental constitutional principles of freedom to punish 
individuals for mere adherence to their faith, no matter how 
stigmatized they are. Courts must now step in to uphold those 
fundamental rights that have been pushed aside out of 
misunderstanding and fear. 
 
